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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
These appeals implicate important issues related to our 
appellate jurisdiction in the context of a dispute over dairy 
regulations. Specifically, we must determine the extent to 
which our jurisdiction extends to District Court orders 
remanding for further factual findings in administrative 
proceedings in light of Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 118 
S. Ct. 1984 (1998). We hold today that because the 
discussion on appellate jurisdiction in Forney is founded 
upon specific language located within the Social Security 
Act, the holding in Forney does not extend to all District 
Court orders remanding for further administrative 
proceedings. We also reaffirm our longstanding rule that we 
lack jurisdiction over District Court orders remanding for 
further administrative findings unless an important legal 
issue has been finally determined which would evade 
appellate review in the absence of an immediate appeal. 
 
Applying these principles to the appeals before us, we 
find that we lack jurisdiction over the appealfiled by 
Kreider Dairy Farm, Inc. ("Kreider") in 1998 from a 1996 
District Court order which remanded for further factual 
findings relating to the merits of the dairy dispute. 
Accordingly, we will dismiss Kreider's appeal (No. 98-1982) 
for lack of jurisdiction. Under these same principles, 
however, we find that we do have appellate jurisdiction over 
the timely appeal filed by the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Agriculture ("USDA") from the District 
Court's August 10, 1998 order reversing a USDA 
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determination that Kreider's administrative appeal on 
remand was untimely (No. 98-1906) and remanding for 
further administrative proceedings on the merits. 
 
With respect to the merits of the USDA's appeal, we hold 
that the District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction over 
Kreider's appeal and accordingly will vacate the District 
Court's 1998 Order. Finally, we will dismiss summarily 
Kreider's "cross-appeal" from the District Court's August 
10, 1998 order (No. 98-1983) as Kreider has informed us 
that it never intended to cross-appeal from that order and 
has not pursued that cross-appeal in its briefing or at oral 
argument before us. 
 
I. 
 
These appeals come to us after a long and tortured 
procedural history that spans nearly a decade. Because this 
procedural history is central to our decision, we shall 
discuss it in some detail. By contrast, because we do not 
reach the merits of the parties' dispute over the dairy 
regulations at issue in these appeals, the underlying factual 
background that forms the basis of that dispute will be 
discussed only generally.1 
 
A. 
 
Kreider is a dairy farm corporation that produces and 
distributes packaged kosher fluid milk within the New 
York-New Jersey milk marketing area with the aid of two 
independent subdistributors. The production and sale of 
milk within the New York-New Jersey milk marketing area 
is regulated by Order 2 which was promulgated under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 ("AMAA"), 7 
U.S.C. S 601 et seq. Under Order 2, certain milk producers 
can qualify for producer-handler status which entitles them 
to an exemption from paying certain fees in connection with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For a more detailed discussion of the merits of the dairy regulation 
dispute see Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, No. Civ. A. 95-6648, 
1996 WL 472414 (E.D. Pa. August 15, 1996); In re: Kreider Dairy Farms, 
Inc., 94 AMA Docket No. M-1-2, 1995 WL 598331 (U.S.D.A. September 
28, 1995). 
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the sales of milk. Kreider first applied for producer-handler 
status under Order 2 by letter dated December 19, 1990. 
 
The Market Administrator ("MA") responsible for 
administering Order 2 denied Kreider's application for 
producer-handler status, finding that Kreider did not meet 
the producer-handler requirements due to Kreider's use 
of independent subdistributors. See generally 7 C.F.R. 
S 1002.12(b)(1999) (setting forth exclusive control 
requirements for producer-handler exemption). On 
December 23, 1993, Kreider challenged the MA's decision 
by filing a petition with the USDA pursuant to section 
608c(15)(A) of the AMAA. 
 
After a December 14, 1994 hearing, an Administrative 
Law Judge ("ALJ") issued a decision holding that Kreider 
was entitled to producer-handler status under Order 2. The 
Agricultural Marketing Service appealed to a Judicial 
Officer ("JO") of the USDA, who acts on behalf of the 
Secretary of Agriculture in all adjudicative matters. See 7 
C.F.R. S 2.35 (1999). The JO reversed the ALJ's decision, 
holding that Kreider was not entitled to producer-handler 
status. See In re: Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc., 94 AMA Docket 
No. M-1-2, 1995 WL 598331 (U.S.D.A. September 28, 
1995). 
 
On October 18, 1995, Kreider filed a complaint pursuant 
to the AMAA in the District Court challenging the JO's 
decision. See AMAA, 7 U.S.C. S 608c(15)(B)(1994). By 
opinion and order filed August 15, 1996 ("1996 Order"), 
the District Court denied the parties' cross motions for 
summary judgment and remanded for further 
administrative findings on whether Kreider was"riding the 
pool," i.e., whether Kreider was the type of dairy for which 
producer-handler status should be denied pursuant to the 
promulgation history of the producer-handler exemption. 
See Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, No. Civ. A. 95- 
6648, 1996 WL 472414 (E.D. Pa. August 15, 1996). Neither 
Kreider nor the USDA appealed the District Court's 1996 
Order at that time. 
 
B. 
 
On remand, the ALJ held a hearing and issued a decision 
on August 12, 1997 holding that Kreider was "riding the 
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pool" and therefore was not entitled to producer-handler 
status. Under applicable regulations, the ALJ's decision 
becomes effective thirty-five (35) days after service upon the 
parties unless appealed to the JO thirty days (30) after 
service. See 7 C.F.R. SS 900.64(c), 900.65(a)(1999). The 
ALJ's decision was served on Kreider on August 15, 1997. 
 
On September 12, 1997, Kreider moved for an extension 
of time to file its appeal from the ALJ's August 12, 1997 
decision. The JO granted Kreider an extension until 
September 19, 1997. On September 19, 1997, Kreider sent 
its appeal via Federal Express next day delivery. The Office 
of the Hearing Clerk stamped Kreider's appeal as received 
on September 25, 1997. 
 
On January 12, 1998, the JO issued an opinion denying 
Kreider's administrative appeal as untimely because, under 
applicable regulations, an administrative appeal is deemed 
to be filed "when it is postmarked, or when it is received by 
the hearing clerk." 7 C.F.R. S 900.69(d)(1999). The JO held 
that because the term "postmarked" requires a United 
States Postal Service postmark, a date label generated by 
Federal Express does not toll the appeal period. See In re: 
Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc., No. 94 AMA Docket No. M-1-2, 
1998 WL 25746, at *8 (U.S.D.A. January 12, 1998). Kreider 
filed a timely motion for reconsideration. 
 
While Kreider's motion for reconsideration was pending 
before the JO, Kreider filed a complaint with the District 
Court on February 2, 1998 challenging the ALJ's August 
12, 1997 decision and noting that the JO had denied its 
appeal as untimely.2 The JO denied Kreider's motion for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. An appeal to the District Court must be taken within twenty days of 
the entry of the administrative decision. See 7 U.S.C.A. 
S 608c(15)(B)(1994). If Kreider had filed a complaint on February 2, 1998 
challenging the JO's January 12, 1998 decision rather than a motion for 
reconsideration, Kreider's February 2, 1998 complaint would have 
constituted a timely appeal of that decision because the twentieth day 
after entry, February 1, 1998, fell on a Sunday. As Kreider conceded 
before the District Court, however, the District Court lacked jurisdiction 
over Kreider's February 2, 1998 complaint challenging the ALJ's August 
12, 1997 decision because that decision was not afinal administrative 
determination. See Kreider, 1998 WL 481926 at *7; see also 7 C.F.R. 
S 900.64(c)(1999)(stating that no decision isfinal for purposes of 
judicial 
review except a final decision issued by the Secretary pursuant to an 
appeal by a party to the ALJ proceeding). 
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reconsideration on February 20, 1998. On April 3, 1998, 
Kreider filed an amended complaint challenging the JO's 
January 12, 1998 and February 20, 1998 decisions. The 
USDA filed a motion to dismiss. 
 
By opinion and order entered August 10, 1998 ("1998 
Order"), the District Court denied the USDA's motion to 
dismiss, vacated the JO's January 12, 1998 and February 
20, 1998 decisions, and remanded for the JO to consider 
the merits of Kreider's appeal of the ALJ's August 12, 1997 
decision. See Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, No. 98- 
518, 1998 WL 481926 (E.D. Pa. August 10, 1998). The 
District Court held that because Kreider's April 3, 1998 
amended complaint challenging the JO's decisions related 
back to Kreider's initial complaint filed on February 2, 
1998, Kreider's appeal of the JO's January 12, 1998 
decision was timely. The District Court further determined 
that because the JO erred in holding that a United States 
postmark was required under applicable regulations, 
Kreider's appeal to the JO from the ALJ's decision was 
timely and should have been considered by the JO. The 
District Court accordingly entered the 1998 Order 
remanding for the JO to consider the merits of Kreider's 
appeal from the ALJ's determination that Kreider was riding 
the pool and therefore was not entitled to producer-handler 
status. 
 
C. 
 
On October 7, 1998, the USDA filed a timely appeal from 
the District Court's 1998 Order which was docketed with 
us at 98-1906. On October 21, 1998, Kreider filed a cross- 
appeal. In Kreider's notice of appeal, Kreider listed the 
docket numbers from the District Court's two prior 
proceedings hoping to bring an appeal from the District 
Court's 1996 Order. Kreider's cross-appeal was treated as 
two separate appeals: 1) a cross-appeal from the District 
Court's 1998 Order (docketed at 98-1983); and 2) an appeal 
from the District Court's 1996 Order (docketed at 98-1982). 
 
On October 30, 1998, we sent a letter to the parties 
questioning our jurisdiction over Kreider's appeal from the 
District Court's 1996 Order. We invited submissions by the 
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parties outlining the basis for our jurisdiction. Both parties 
submitted letters. In its letter, the USDA contends that we 
have jurisdiction over Kreider's appeal from the District 
Court's 1996 Order under Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 
(1998) and Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617 (1990). In 
addition, both the USDA and Kreider cite Forney as the 
basis for our jurisdiction in their briefs. Kreider also asserts 
various other grounds for jurisdiction in its letter. Both 
parties seem to recognize that Kreider never intended to file 
a cross-appeal from the District Court's 1998 Order. 
 
II. 
 
Even though Kreider and the USDA agree that we have 
jurisdiction over the appeals before us, it is well established 
that we have an independent duty to satisfy ourselves of 
our appellate jurisdiction regardless of the parties' 
positions. See, e.g., Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 
F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). The District Court orders 
from which both Kreider and the USDA have appealed are 
orders remanding for further administrative proceedings. 
Normally, an order remanding for further proceedings is not 
a final order subject to immediate appellate review under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. See AJA Assocs. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 
817 F.2d 1070, 1073 (3d Cir. 1987)(quoting United 
Steelworkers of Am., Local 1913 v. Union R.R. Co., 648 F.2d 
905, 909 (3d Cir. 1981)). Naturally, however, this general 
rule is subject to several exceptions.3  
 
A. 
 
We traditionally have recognized an exception to the 
general finality rule for certain District Court orders 
remanding for further administrative proceedings. 
Specifically, we have exercised appellate review when a 
District Court finally resolves an important legal issue in 
reviewing an administrative agency action and denial of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We refer to "exception" in its general sense that the order on appeal 
has not resolved all of the issues with respect to all of the parties. We 
agree with the concurrence that only Congress can set forth the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
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appellate review before remand to the agency would 
foreclose appellate review as a practical matter. See AJA, 
817 F.2d at 1073 (citing Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 
F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1987)); Union R.R., 648 F.2d at 909. 
 
An example of an immediately appealable remand under 
this exception is found in AJA, 817 F.2d 1070. After the 
Army Corps denied AJA's application for a permit, AJA filed 
suit in District Court. AJA, 817 F.2d at 1071-72. The 
District Court denied the Corps' motion for summary 
judgment and remanded holding that AJA was entitled to 
an administrative hearing. Id. at 1072. The Corps appealed. 
 
We exercised jurisdiction over the Corps' appeal even 
though the District Court's order remanding for further 
administrative proceedings was not a final order. We noted 
that the District Court had resolved an important legal 
issue opening the door to arguments by all applicants that 
they are entitled to a hearing prior to a permit denial. Id. at 
1073. In addition, we found that the issue may evade 
appellate review; if the Corps granted AJA a permit on 
remand, the Corps would be unable to appeal the hearing 
issue and if the Corps denied AJA a permit, the issue of 
whether AJA is entitled to a hearing would be moot. Id. For 
these reasons, we held that the Corps' appeal fell within 
our previously recognized exception to the finality rule. 
 
B. 
 
In addition to our well established exception to the 
finality rule for certain District Court orders remanding for 
further administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court 
recently carved out a very specific exception to the finality 
rule for remand orders under the Social Security Act. See 
Forney, 524 U.S. 266, and Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617. In 
Finkelstein, the Court held that the District Court's order 
effectively holding that certain regulations were invalid and 
remanding for further administrative findings without 
resort to those regulations was immediately appealable. The 
Court relied heavily upon specific language within the 
Social Security Act in reaching this decision.4 The Court, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Specifically, the Court found that a District Court's order remanding 
for further administrative proceedings under the Social Security Act is a 
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however, also noted that if benefits were awarded on 
remand under the inquiry mandated by the District Court 
"there would be grave doubt" as to whether the Secretary 
could appeal his own order. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 625. 
 
As the Court's recent decision in Forney makes clear, 
however, the Finkelstein rationale is limited to the specific 
language found in the Social Security Act. In Forney, the 
Court held that not only can the Secretary appeal 
immediately an order remanding for further administrative 
proceedings, but that a claimant equally is entitled to 
appeal a District Court order remanding for further 
administrative proceedings. The Court reasoned that 
Finkelstein primarily was based on the language of the 
Social Security Act and that the reasoning in Finkelstein 
does not "permit an inference that `finality' turns on the 
order's importance, or the availability (or lack of availability) 
of an avenue for appeal from the different, later, agency 
determination that might emerge after remand." Forney, 
524 U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 1987. 
 
After Forney, it is clear that Finkelstein did not simply 
apply our general exception to finality to a social security 
case, but rather created a separate exception to thefinality 
rule based on the language of the Social Security Act. 
Accordingly, Forney cannot be read to extend appellate 
jurisdiction to all District Court orders remanding for 
further administrative proceedings as the parties contend, 
but rather speaks only to appellate jurisdiction under 
statutes containing language comparable to that found in 
the Social Security Act. This conclusion is supported by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
final judgment subject to immediate appeal under the following 
language: 
 
       [T]he district court shall have the power to enter `a judgment 
       affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, 
with 
       or without remanding the cause for rehearing.' 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       `[t]he judgment of the court shall be final except that it shall be 
       subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in other civil 
       actions.' 
 
Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 625 (emphasis in original). 
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fact that, to date, no court has applied Forney to a case not 
arising under the Social Security Act. As the USDA 
concedes, the AMAA does not contain language comparable 
to that found in the Social Security Act. Forney and 
Finkelstein therefore do not control our jurisdiction over 
these appeals. 
 
C. 
 
Given that Forney and Finkelstein do not control our 
jurisdiction over these appeals, we return to our general 
exception to the finality rule to determine whether we have 
jurisdiction over either of the appeals before us. 
Specifically, we must determine whether either the 1996 
Order or 1998 Order finally resolves an important legal 
issue over which appellate review would be foreclosed as a 
practical matter in the absence of an immediate appeal. 
 
In its 1996 Order, the District Court determined that 
the language relating to producer-handler status was 
ambiguous and that it was appropriate to resort to the 
promulgation history of the provision at issue. The District 
Court then remanded for further factual findings as to 
whether Kreider was the type of dairy the provision was 
meant to include. On remand, the ALJ determined that 
Kreider was not entitled to producer-handler status. This 
determination was subject to review by a JO and then by 
the District Court. 
 
Under our exception to the finality rule, the 1996 Order 
is not subject to immediate appeal. It does notfinally 
resolve a particularly important legal issue and, more 
importantly, it is not an order that will evade appellate 
review. Absent an order that would evade review, our 
interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation and duplicative 
efforts overrides any interest we may have in entertaining 
the merits of Kreider's appeal at this juncture. Accordingly, 
our traditional exception to finality in agency proceedings 
does not afford us jurisdiction over Kreider's appeal from 
the 1996 Order.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. At oral argument, the USDA asserted that if we intended to examine 
the merits of Kreider's appeal, the USDA could file a cross-appeal from 
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Our exception, however, does provide appellate 
jurisdiction over the USDA's timely appeal from the 1998 
Order. This order vacated the JO's determination that 
Kreider's appeal was untimely and remanded for the JO to 
hear the merits of Kreider's appeal from the ALJ's decision. 
This decision resolves an issue of law that may evade 
review if immediate appeal is not permitted; should Kreider 
receive the relief it seeks on remand, it is doubtful that the 
USDA would be able to appeal its own decision in order to 
raise the procedural issues decided by the District Court in 
its 1998 Order. Therefore, under our exception for agency 
appeals, we have jurisdiction over the USDA's appeal from 
the 1998 Order.6 
 
III. 
 
Having established that we have jurisdiction over the 
USDA's appeal of the District Court's 1998 Order, we turn 
now to the merits of that appeal. The USDA asserts that the 
District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Kreider's 
appeal and in holding that Kreider's administrative appeal 
was timely. Because we agree that it was improper for the 
District Court to exercise jurisdiction over Kreider's appeal, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the District Court's 1996 Order at this juncture to bring its position on 
the merits before us. Setting aside the obvious problems with the 
timeliness of such an appeal at this late date, we wish to make clear that 
because the District Court's 1996 Order is not afinal order over which 
we have appellate jurisdiction, the USDA is equally precluded from 
appealing the 1996 Order. 
 
6. Our exception to the finality doctrine for agency appeals mirrors to a 
large extent the collateral order doctrine, which Kreider has raised as a 
possible basis for our jurisdiction over its appeal. Under the collateral 
order doctrine, an otherwise non-final order is immediately appealable if 
it finally and conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves an 
important issue separate from the underlying merits, and is effectively 
unreviewable after final judgment. See In re Tutu Wells Contamination 
Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 378 (3d Cir. 1997)(citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). Under either exception to the 
finality rule, we have jurisdiction over the USDA's appeal but not 
Kreider's appeal. We likewise reject Kreider's other asserted grounds for 
our jurisdiction over its appeal as baseless. 
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we will vacate the District Court's 1998 Order without 
reaching the issue of whether Kreider's administrative 
appeal was timely. 
 
After the District Court's initial remand via the 1996 
Order, Kreider first filed a complaint in the District Court 
on February 2, 1998. In this complaint, Kreider sought 
review of the ALJ's August 12, 1997 decision on the merits. 
At that time, Kreider's motion for reconsideration of the 
JO's January 12, 1998 order, which dismissed Kreider's 
administrative appeal as untimely, was still pending. It is 
clear to us that the District Court did not have jurisdiction 
over Kreider's February 2, 1998 complaint. 
 
First, as the District Court recognized, it did not have 
jurisdiction to review the ALJ's August 12, 1997 decision 
because that decision is not a final agency decision subject 
to judicial review. See Kreider, 1998 WL 481926 at *7. 
Second, even if Kreider's February 2, 1998 complaint had 
challenged the JO's January 12, 1998 decision, which it did 
not, the District Court would have lacked jurisdiction to 
review that decision at that time due to Kreider's pending 
motion for reconsideration. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 
391 (1995)(noting the general rule that the timely filing of 
a motion to reconsider an agency's action generally renders 
the underlying order nonfinal for purposes of judicial 
review); West Penn Power Co. v. United States Envtl. 
Protection Agency, 860 F.2d 581, 584 (3d Cir. 1988) (same).7 
 
Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain any appeal by Kreider on February 2, 1998, the 
date Kreider filed its first complaint, the District Court 
erred in exercising jurisdiction under the theory that 
Kreider's April 3, 1998 amended complaint related back to 
Kreider's February 2, 1998 complaint. An amended 
complaint that purports to relate back to an original 
complaint asserting an improper appeal which wasfiled on 
a date upon which the District Court would have lacked 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The courts have recognized a limited exception to this rule for 
immigration cases based upon language found in the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act. See Stone, 514 U.S. at 393-95. Because the AMAA 
contains no comparable language, this exception does not apply to 
Kreider's appeal. 
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jurisdiction over the appeal raised in the amended 
complaint, must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 748 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 
1984) (holding that District Court properly dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction amended complaint that could only 
relate back to pleading filed on a date upon which the 
District Court would have lacked jurisdiction over the 
issues asserted). Absent a viable relation back theory, 
Kreider's April 3, 1998 complaint is an untimely appeal of 
the JO's January 12, 1998 decision.8 Accordingly, because 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Kreider's appeal 
of the JO's January 12, 1997 decision, we will vacate the 
District Court's 1998 Order. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss summarily 
Kreider's cross-appeal from the District Court's 1998 Order 
(No. 98-1983), dismiss Kreider's appeal from the District 
Court's 1996 Order (No. 98-1982) for lack of jurisdiction, 
and vacate the judgment of the District Court in the 
USDA's appeal from the District Court's 1998 Order (No. 
98-1906). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Kreider does not dispute that its April 3, 1998 amended complaint 
was filed more than twenty days after the District Court's February 20, 
1998 denial of Kreider's motion for reconsideration of the JO's January 
12, 1998 decision and therefore is untimely absent a viable relation back 
theory. See 7 U.S.C. S 608c(15)(B)(1994). 
 
 
                                14 
  
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I concur in the opinion of Judge Mansmann. I write 
separately to express my concern that our opinions, and 
those of other courts, dealing with the issue of appellate 
jurisdiction over district court orders remanding to an 
administrative agency have used language that is 
inconsistent with basic principles of federal jurisdiction. In 
particular, I take issue with language referring to our 
jurisdiction in that instance as an "exception" to the finality 
rule. See, e.g., Bridge v. United States Parole Commission, 
981 F.2d 97, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 287 (3d Cir. 1988); Perales v. 
Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1348, 1353 (2d Cir. 1348). In plain 
words, there can be no judicially created "exception" to the 
jurisdiction Congress has granted the courts of appeals. 
 
I. 
 
Any analysis of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals 
must begin with the recognition that under our 
Constitutional separation of powers it is Congress that sets 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the judiciary has 
no power to make exceptions to the congressional 
determinations in that respect. See United States v. 
Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 264 (1982) (per 
curiam); see also 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 3905, at 232 (2d ed. 1991). 
 
When Congress made its initial division of the 
jurisdiction between the federal trial courts and the 
appellate courts, it drew the line at final decisions. "The 
general principle of federal appellate jurisdiction, derived 
from the common law and enacted by the First Congress, 
requires that review of nisi prius proceedings await their 
termination by final judgment." DiBella v. United States, 
369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (citing First Judiciary Act, SS 21, 
22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83, 84, 85 (1789)); see also 15A Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, supra, S 3907, at 268 ("For two centuries, 
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the final judgment rule has been the heart of appellate 
jurisdiction in the federal system.").9  
 
With few exceptions, that remains the touchstone today. 
The Supreme Court has explained that the final judgment 
rule discourages piecemeal appeals which carry with them 
the potential for harassment and excessive costs for 
litigants, see Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 
325-26 (1940); 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, S 3905, 
at 239, and protects the independence of the district judge, 
see Firestone, 449 U.S. at 374. The final judgment rule has 
survived because it is generally believed that it"promot[es] 
efficient judicial administration." Id. (citing Eisen v. Carlisle 
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974)). 
 
Over the years, Congress has made discrete decisions 
"that particular policies require that private rights be 
vindicable immediately." See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop 
Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 880 n.7 (1994) (discussing 
provision for immediate appeal under 9 U.S.C. S 16(a) when 
district court declines to send case to commercial 
arbitrator). However, such a decision is always 
characterized by an express congressional judgment. See, 
e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) (authorizing appeal from 
interlocutory orders granting, modifying, denying etc. 
injunctions); 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) (authorizing interlocutory 
appeal on certification). The Supreme Court has cautioned 
that the existence of those congressional policy judgments 
"by no means suggests that [the courts] should now be 
more ready to make similar judgments for themselves" and 
to expand the scope of appellate jurisdiction beyond that 
set by Congress. Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 880 n.7. 
 
II. 
 
It follows that the references to "exceptions" to our 
statutorily authorized jurisdiction are misguided. Even the 
Supreme Court has no power to make an exception to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. A final judgment is "a decision by the District Court that ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but 
execute the judgment." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 
368, 373 (1981). 
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finality rule that does not have a statutory predicate. 
Nonetheless, opinions of the lower federal courts repeatedly 
refer to the collateral order "exception" emanating from the 
holding of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949), that the courts of appeals have jurisdiction 
over "a small class of orders" that, albeit not the final 
decision in the case, resolve important questions completely 
separate from the merits, which would be effectively 
unreviewable were they to wait appeal from the final 
judgment in the underlying action. The notion of an 
"exception" to the finality doctrine is illogical as Congress 
alone establishes our appellate jurisdiction. 
 
The collateral order doctrine was hardly a new theory of 
finality never previously comprehended. More than two 
decades earlier, the Court stated that, althoughfinal 
judgments are the rule, 
 
       it is well settled that an adjudication final in its nature 
       as to a matter distinct from the general subject of the 
       litigation and affecting only the parties to the particular 
       controversy, may be reviewed without awaiting the 
       determination of the general litigation. 
 
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 
411, 414 (1926). 
 
A leading treatise observes that "[t]he most certain aspect 
of collateral order appeals is that they depend on 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, and thus must be characterized as appeals from 
`final decisions.' " 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, 
S 3911, at 347; see also id. S 3911, at 349 (emphasizing 
that S 1291 "remains the only available foundation" for 
collateral orders doctrine). Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly adopted the view that jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal from a collateral order falls within the authority 
conferred by S 1291. 
 
In Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 917 (1997), the 
Court stated: "In [Cohen], as in all of our cases following it, 
we were construing the federal statutory language of 28 
U.S.C. S 1291." In his scholarly opinion in Digital Equipment 
Corp., Justice Souter explained that "[t]he collateral order 
doctrine is best understood not as an exception to the `final 
decision' rule laid down by Congress in S 1291, but as a 
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`practical construction' of it." 511 U.S. at 867. See also 
Firestone, 449 U.S. at 368 ("Cohen did not establish new 
law; rather, it continued a tradition of givingS 1291 a 
`practical rather than a technical construction.' "); Coopers 
& Lybrand, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) ("[T]he Court held [the 
Cohen order] appealable as a `final decision' under 
S 1291."); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) 
("[T]his Court held [in Cohen] that the Court of Appeals had 
jurisdiction under S 1291 to entertain an appeal from the 
District Court's pretrial order." (emphasis added)). 
 
I agree with the majority that the two cases arising under 
the Social Security Act, Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 
617 (1990), and Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266 (1998), 
represent an exception to the final judgment rule. But the 
exception is one made by Congress, not the courts. 
 
In Finkelstein, the Court considered the jurisdiction of 
the courts of appeals to hear an appeal by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services from a district court's order 
invalidating regulations issued by the Secretary and 
remanding to the agency for renewed consideration of the 
claim for benefits. The Court observed that the language of 
42 U.S.C. S 405(g) in the Social Security Act permitted a 
district court to enter " `a judgment affirming, modifying, or 
reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without 
remanding the cause for a rehearing.' " Id. at 625 (quoting 
S 405(g)) (emphasis omitted). Further, S 405(g) made clear 
that such a judgment was " `final except that it shall be 
subject to review in the same manner as a judgment in 
other civil actions.' " Id. (quotingS 405(g)) (emphasis 
omitted). In light of this language, the Court concluded that 
Congress had "define[d] a class of orders as `final 
judgments' that by inference would be appealable under 
S 1291." Id. at 628. Justice Blackmun concurred, but 
stated he would have treated the appeal as falling within 
the confines of the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 632 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 
The issue arose eight years later in Forney v. Apfel, 524 
U.S. 266 (1998). There, it was an individual seeking 
benefits, rather than the government, who appealed the 
district court's decision following a remand to the agency 
under S 405(g). The Court rejected the collateral order 
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theory as the basis for appellate jurisdiction and 
emphasized, in a unanimous opinion, that Congress had 
created a class of orders through S 405(g) that were 
appealable as final orders under S 1291. Thus, because the 
district court decisions at issue in Finkelstein and Forney 
were a class of orders declared "final" by Congress by 
construction of the language of the Social Security Act, they 
provide little assistance on the issue facing us now, the 
appealability of an order remanding to an agency under a 
statute that has no comparable provision for appeal. 
 
Of course, it would have facilitated our decision as to our 
appellate jurisdiction over an order remanding to an 
administrative agency if Congress had explicitly provided 
for such, and it may be that cases such as this will lead it 
to consider doing so. In any event, the precedent allowing 
such an appeal in appropriate circumstances, including 
that from this court, precludes any retreat now. 
 
The most obvious analog, and the one relied on by many 
courts of appeals, is the collateral order doctrine, 
notwithstanding the fact that most of the agency remand 
orders would not qualify because the remand would rarely 
be on an issue separate from the merits. See 15B Wright, 
Miller & Cooper, supra, S 3914.32, at 240 (asserting that 
"[a]n impressive number of cases" permit appeal under the 
doctrine). It has been suggested that the tendency is to 
accept the appeals of government agencies, apparently 
because "administrative agencies, as more or less 
coordinate branches of government, deserve the protection 
of special appeal opportunities." Id. at 56-57 n.9 (Supp. 
1999) (citing, inter alia, Bergerco Canada v. United States 
Treasury Dep't, 129 F.3d 189, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
Baca-Prieto v. Guigni, 95 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 
1996); Hanauer v. Reich, 82 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (4th Cir. 
1996); Schuck v. Frank, 27 F.3d 194, 196-97 (6th Cir. 
1994)). But see Cotton Petrol., Inc. v. United States Dep't of 
the Interior, 870 F.2d 1515, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1989); AJA 
Assocs. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 817 F.2d 1070, 1072-73 
(3d Cir. 1987)). 
 
Wright, Miller, and Cooper have summarized the reasons 
courts rely on the collateral orders doctrine. In some 
circumstances, an agency may be statutorily barred from 
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appealing its own decision. In others, the agency's decision 
will render the issue moot, because the agency has 
complied with the district court's order. Additionally, 
agencies ought not face the risk of contempt to prompt an 
immediate appeal, or the danger that the agency will be 
unable to recapture later any benefits paid in the interim. 
See 15B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra , S 3914.32, at 240- 
41. 
 
I agree that a practical construction of finality suffices to 
justify review of an agency remand order in appropriate 
cases. Such an approach is a considerable improvement 
over viewing the basis of our jurisdiction as an"exception 
to finality." 
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